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THOMPSON V. HUD:
GROUNDBREAKING HOUSING DESEGREGATION
LITIGATION, AND THE SIGNIFICANT TASK AHEAD OF
ACHIEVING AN EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION REMEDY
WITHOUT ENGENDERING NEW SOCIAL HARMS
GINA KLINE*
"Baltimore City should not be viewed as an island reservation for use
as a container for all of the poor of a contiguous region ......
-Judge Marvin J. Garbis, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Housing desegregation litigation in the United States is current-
ly marked by a tension between the state's interest in reversing the ef-
fects of intentional racial discrimination in housing and the process of
securing the means best tailored for doing so. The Fourth Circuit has
continued to grapple with this problem for more than a decade in its
continuing review of Thompson v. HUD.' In the 1995 Thompson deci-
sion, the court considered whether the United States. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) acted unlawfully by failing
to work affirmatively to desegregate Baltimore City public housing
following the prohibition of dejure segregation.2 The action consisted
of a class of African American plaintiffs, residents of Baltimore City
public housing, who claimed discrimination on the basis of race.3 The
Plaintiffs' 1995 complaint contended that the Baltimore public housing
system, established in the 1930's as a dejure segregated program, was
yet to be desegregated by 1995 in violation of both Constitutional and
statutory law. The parties entered into a 1996 consent decree whereby
* J.D., 2008. University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. See e.g., Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 398, 461 (D. Md. 2005) (Citing testimony indicat-
ing that 86% of all "hardscape" public housing units in Baltimore City, during the 1990's,
were cited in Census tracts with African-American percentages above the citywide average in
1990, and that in 2002, within the public housing units, 98% of Baltimore's family tenants in
public housing developments were African-American, and each public housing development
on the whole was at least 91% African-American).
3. See e.g., Thompson v. HUD, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 294, 411 (D. Md. 2005) (defin-
ing the class as "all African-Americans who resided in Baltimore City family public housing
units.., between January 31, 1995 and June 25, 1996, who presently reside in Baltimore City
family public housing units or who will in the future reside in Baltimore City family public
housing units...").
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HUD pledged to take affirmative steps to desegregate Baltimore's
public housing stock. However, in April 2004, the Fourth Circuit held
that HUD violated the terms of the consent decree and, in so doing, vi-
olated § 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act.
At the time of this writing, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland has yet to release its findings on the most ap-
propriate remedial action to be taken. However, Thompson's remedy
phase highlights the epicenter of the current housing desegregation de-
bate. A discernible line is drawn between plans to remedy the effects
of urban racial housing segregation by the inclusion of court-ordered
relocation of complainants to outlying suburban districts, as the Plain-
tiff class demands, and plans that do not include a suburban solution.
Section II of this paper outlines the specific procedural history
and findings of the various stages of the Thompson v. HUD case. Sec-
tion III provides the relevant legal background and precedent. Section
IV presents a summary of the court's reasoning in Thompson v. HUD.
Section V. is an analysis finding that if the District Court of the Dis-
trict of Maryland decides to adopt a Gautreaux 4 styled remedy - pro-
viding a court-ordered relocation of residents of Baltimore City hous-
ing projects to the outlying suburbs- it is likely to create new social
harms in the suburbs such as (1) significant employment barriers to
former public housing residents, (2) an overall lack of social capital for
movers once they arrive in the suburbs, (3) increased transportation
costs, and (4) conflict with "not in my backyard" attitudes. This paper
concludes that for the Thompson v. HUD remedy to be effective it
must include more than just a mobility program, it must also serve to
require the investment of resources in developing affordable housing
in mixed income developments inside the city, for instance, through
inclusionary zoning.
II. THE CASE
A. Facts and Procedural History
The Thompson plaintiffs' 1995 complaint contended that well
after the prohibition of segregation in public schools and facilities and
the passage of several important laws banning segregation and dis-
crimination in housing,5 Baltimore had yet to desegregate its public
housing stock in violation of both the Constitution and applicable sta-
4. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
5. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294; 42 U.S.C. 2000(d); 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
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tutory law. Plaintiffs claimed, on the one hand, that HUD exclusively
assigned Baltimore's white public housing applicants to what were
formerly dejure segregated "white housing projects," and on the other
hand assigned black applicants to formerly de jure segregated "black
housing projects," keeping the two populations of low-income tenants
in largely separate Baltimore neighborhoods with disparate resources
and opportunities. The complaint also alleged that many of the original
"black housing projects" faced demolition and that almost all of the
sites expected to be developed for replacement housing were located in
minority neighborhoods with large concentrations of low-income
housing, also within Baltimore City limits.
6
The action was initially resolved by a 1996 consent decree
agreement between the parties which called for 3,000 new housing op-
portunities for public housing residents along with the distribution of
7
new housing vouchers for residents to move to higher-income areas.
However, in April 2004, the Fourth Circuit held that HUD violated §
3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act by failing to consider "regional
approaches" to eliminating racial segregation in Baltimore public
housing, thereby failing to meet the requirements of the consent de-
cree.
8
Section 3608(e)(5) of the Fair Housing Act requires HUD to
"administer [housing] programs ... in a manner affirmatively to fur-
ther the policies of the [Fair Housing] Act [and] these policies include
the provision of housing free from discrimination."9 The Fourth Cir-
cuit found that HUD failed to consider regional approaches in dese-
gregation policies even though "Baltimore City is contiguous to, and
linked by public transportation and roads to, Baltimore and Anne
Arundel Counties and in close proximity to other counties in the Bal-
6. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 398, 461 (n. 119) (D. Md. 2005) (stating that the de-
molished sites were Lexington Terrace (677 units), Fairfield (300 units), Flag House (487
units), Lafayette Courts (816 units), The Broadway (429 units), Hollander Ridge (1,000 units),
Murphy Homes (758 units), Spencer Gardens (20 units), and Julian Gardens (23 units) many
of which were replaced by lower density housing on virtually the same sites, without one to
one replacement of units).
7. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND, THE CASE OF THOMPSON V.
HUD: A BRIEFING ON SEGREGATION AND PUBLIC HOUSING IN BALTIMORE, http://www.aclu-
md.org/aTop%201ssues/Fair /o2Ohousing/ThompsonBriefing.pdf (last visited April 24, 2008).
8. See Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 408 (stating that "Baltimore City contains only
approximately 30% of the Baltimore Region's households [ and further] in 1940, 19 percent of
the population of Baltimore City was African-American [but] by 2000, the population of Bal-
timore City was 64 percent African-American, while the population of the rest of the Balti-
more Region was 15 percent Black" and finding that to affirmatively promote fair housing
HUD must consider public housing opportunities outside of the city-limits).
9. Id.
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timore Region."' 0 The court characterized HUD's failure to utilize out-
lying suburban areas, vital components of the Baltimore housing mar-
ket, for low-income and public housing to be "an abuse of discretion"
most like "effectively wearing blinders that limited [its] vision beyond
Baltimore City."" The court found that wearing such "blinders" in ef-
fect amounted to failure to fulfill the mandate of Section 3608(e)(5).
In January 2006, Thompson was submitted to a remedy phase
in the United States District Court, where defendant HUD filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment arguing that the court erred in finding it li-
12
able. Even if it was liable, HUD also argued, there was no possible
remedial action for the court to take. 13 Judge Marvin Garbis of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the
motion for summary judgment, finding the defendant still liable, and
finding remedial action still appropriate. Plaintiffs' counsel submitted
a brief entitled "Plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order" asking the court
to order a multifaceted remedial plan, the crux of which is to desegre-
gate Baltimore's public housing by allowing public housing residents
to move to various designated outlying suburban areas under the
court's supervision. At present, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland has yet to release its findings on the most appro-
priate remedial action to be taken.
B. Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedy
The Plaintiffs' proposed remedy includes provisions for the
implementation of new fair housing review and monitoring stan-
dards. 14 Further, the plan asks for the use of remedial vouchers in
"Communities of Opportunity" or those census tracts in the Baltimore
Housing Market identified as "high" or "very high" opportunity
areas. 1 5 Plaintiffs proposed remedy stipulates that no fewer than half
of all rental housing units developed with investment of federal re-
10. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
11. Id.
12. Thompson, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9416 (D. Md. 2006).
13. Id.
14. See "Plaintiff's Proposed Remedial Order," Civil Action No. MJG095-309, 22 (D.
Md. 2006) (recommending such new standards as the achievement of a minimum number of
vouchers placed in specified communities, a mandated diversity of locations for the use of
such vouchers, an accounting of the effectiveness of housing search assistance, and recording
of the duration of residency for those who place vouchers).
15. See "Plaintiff's Proposed Remedial Order," Civil Action No. MJG095-309, I (D.
Md. 2006) (defining areas as "high opportunity" based on such criteria as "economic, educa-
tional, and neighborhood health indicators" and to be reviewed for accuracy every two years).
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sources be located in these so-called Communities of Opportunity and
be affordable to families at or below 30 percent of median family in-
come, with only a few narrowly drawn exceptions. This provision is
significant in that it asks the court to order that at least half of all fed-
erally subsidized units be located in traditionally "all-white" Baltimore
suburban areas, places that formerly existed virtually without the pres-
ence of any public housing whatsoever, and, further, it mandates that
such units be affordable to low-income families. 16 Additionally, the
proposed remedy demands that HUD "shall not approve" any plans for
demolition of public housing in the Baltimore Region to reduce the
number of affordable (or assisted) housing in Communities of Oppor-
tunity unless the reduction is offset by a one-to-one replacement of
such units. 17 Presumably, this provision was intended to avoid the sig-
nificant loss of affordable, low-income units that took place in Balti-
more during numerous demolitions of public housing developments
where replacement strategies were not in place.'8
To achieve the administration of this "mobility program" - or
the moving of the Plaintiff class from highly segregated city public
housing units to the suburbs - the proposed remedial plan asks for
vouchers to be administered by a "Regional Administrator," or coordi-
nator of the "Regional Mobility Program."' 19 Through such a program,
HUD "shall" work with local Public Housing Authorities ("PHA's") to
arrange the placement of plaintiffs in housing units in Communities of
Opportunity.* To avoid replicating the segregation of Baltimore City
in the suburbs, the Regional Administrator is given the task of prohi-
biting referrals of plaintiffs to housing units where more than twenty
percent of the units in any one apartment complex or development are
leased by Housing Choice Voucher holders. Additionally, the Re-
gional Administrator is tasked with taking into account such factors as
(1) the number of children in the local school receiving "free and re-
duced meals," and (2) whether in the particular Community of Oppor-
16. See e.g., Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (stating that "during the 1990's, 89% of
public housing units developed with HUD's support in the Baltimore Region were in Balti-
more City [and] in sharp contrast, none at all was sited in contiguous Baltimore County").
17. See "Plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order," supra note 14 at 11.
18. See supra note 4.
19. See "Plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order," supra note 14 at 23 (explaining that the
value of the vouchers, which are to be used as the primary form of payment in renting a hous-
ing unit in a non-segregated region, are to be determined by deliberations between the Public
Housing Authority and the Regional Administrator).
20. Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP), a federally subsidized tenant assistance
program, was formerly referred to as "Section 8 housing" because the program derived from
Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §
5309 (2006)).
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tunity under consideration, the African-American population is already
above the average for the region, or if the particular community is re-
ceivin a disproportionate number of placements through the pro-
gram.
Finally, the Plaintiffs proposed remedy asks for the Court to
procure a "Mobility Counselor" to provide counseling to persons seek-
ing to use vouchers in suburban opportunity areas. Plaintiff class fami-
lies are not obliged to participate in the program, however, if they do,
they may still remain on other public housing waiting lists. 22 The
counseling includes outreach to the Plaintiff families, outreach and re-
cruitment of landlords, owners, and developers of housing units, out-
reach to community organizations, and housing search assistance to
the Plaintiff families, and intensive post-move counseling. 23
The core demand of the Plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order is
the use of 9,000 housing opportunities in Communities of Opportunity
at a rate of 900 per year for ten years. Under the proposed plan, HUD
is given credit toward the 9,000 unit goal with each placement of a
member of the plaintiff class in a Community of Opportunity. 24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Prohibition of Racial Segregation in Housing
Even though specific statutory standards expressly prohibiting
discrimination in federally assisted housing have been in place for
more than forty years, racial discrimination and segregation in suchS25
programs is still pervasive in twenty-first century America. There are
three main legal protections against housing discrimination in place in
the United States, and they are discussed below: (1) constitutional pro-
tection, (2) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (3) the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.
21. "Plaintiffs Proposed Remedial Order," Civil Action No. MJG095-309, 17 (D. Md.
2006).
22. "Plaintiff's Proposed Remedial Order," Civil Action No. MJG095-309, 18 (D. Md.
2006).
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 13.
25. See e.g., Florence Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination
and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L. J. 913, 915 (2005) (stating that
"the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study showed continuing, substantial discrimination
against Blacks and Hispanics in the rental and sale of housing and the 2000 Census demon-
strated that if it continued to decline at the same rate, it would be decades before a moderate
level of segregation were reached.").
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1. Constitutional Protection
The Fifth Amendment guarantee of the United States Constitu-
tion establishes an obligation on the part of the federal government to
further housing free from discrimination.26 In Boiling v. Sharpe,7 the
Court found that just as racial segregation in state-sponsored public
schools was found unconstitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 racially-segregated public
schools in the District of Columbia, a federal jurisdiction, was a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 29 Thus, the
United States Constitution forbids the federal government from inten-
tionally contributing to racial segregation, a practice found to be inhe-
rently discriminatory.
These constitutional protections apply to the housing context as
well. To be afforded Constitutional protection in the housing segrega-
tion context, a plaintiff must prove not only that segregation exists in
public housing, but that the segregation is the result of purposeful dis-
crimination on the part of the defendant. For instance, in Village ofAr-
lington Heights, where a non-profit developer sought to build low-
income housing on a fifteen acre parcel of land within a village and a
local zoning board denied his petition for re-zoning, the denial of re-
zoning failed to be found unconstitutional because it lacked a requisite
"discriminatory purpose" in addition to proof of disparate impact.
30
2. The 1964 Civil Rights Act
Despite the court-ordered desegregation of public schools and
the widespread acceptance that segregation in public education is un-
constitutional, segregation in federally assisted housing has persisted
into the present day.31 In the past, many of the statutory protections
passed to prevent racial discrimination, in addition to constitutional
protection, were without teeth when applied to the public housing con-
text. For instance, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed in-
to law to provide that "no person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Brown v. Bd. of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). According to BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004) disparate impact constitutes "the adverse effect of a facially neu-
tral practice that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national
origin, age, or disability," thereby making discriminatory intent irrelevant in a disparate-
impact claim.
3 1. See supra, note 21.
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tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any program ... receiving Federal financial assistance." 32 Howev-
er, as noted by Professor Florence Roisman, the Act excluded from the
definition of "federal financial assistance" a "contract of insurance or
guaranty" where the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 33 and
Veterans Administration (VA) housing programs operated on the basis
of insured and guaranteed home loans, respectively. 34 Thus, housing
secured through the FHA or VA were not covered by the Act. Addi-
tionally, the Act failed to address explicitly the correction of past dis-
crimination or segregation when most federally assisted housing units
remained segregated as remnants of an extensive past of dejure segre-
gation in federally assisted housing. The 1977 Interagency Survey of
HUD Title VI enforcement revealed neglect in HUD's performance in
preventing segregation in public housing, citing HUD for failing to
develop an effective Title VI review program, failure to remedy
known civil rights violations, and a tenant assignment plan that did
nothing to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. 3Nevertheless, sever-
al notable cases found HUD liable under Title VI for the perpetuation
of discrimination in federally assisted housing.
36
3. The "Fair Housing Act"
Statutory protections from housing discrimination and segrega-
tion became more stringent with the passage of Title VIII of the 1968
Civil Rights Act ("The Fair Housing Act").37 Even though the Su-
preme Court ruled that proof of intentional discrimination was re-
quired to establish a violation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Constitution, 38 the Court has al-
lowed the requirement of disparate impact, alone, to stand for proof of
unconstitutional discrimination pursuant to Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
32. "1964 Civil Rights Act," Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000d (2004)).
33. Federal agency that preceded HUD.
34. Florence Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segre-
gation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L. J. 913, n. 1 (2005).
35. Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1047 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
36. See e.g., Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (1969) (finding HUD liable for perpe-
tuating segregation in federally assisted housing in Bogalusa, Louisiana in violation of § 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970) (establishing
that HUD violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by attempting to place a concentrated devel-
opment of federally assisted housing in a mostly black, low-income neighborhood of Philadel-
phia).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3601
38. Village ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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Rights Act.39 The Act prohibits segregation as well as discrimination
in housing by creating an affirmative duty for HUD to eradicate such
problems. Section 3608(e)(5) of the Act requires that HUD "adminis-
ter [housing] programs.., in a manner affirmatively to further the pol-
icies of this subchapter," and among these policies is the policy "to
provide, within constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the
United States."4 °
In N.A.A.C.P. v. HUD, Justice Breyer recognized that Section
3608(e)(5) confers more than a duty upon HUD to refrain from segre-
gation, but, rather, an affirmative obligation to provide integrated
housing and to prevent segregation. 41 As stated in Otero v. NYHA, "ac-
tion must be taken [by HUD] to fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of
open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the in-
crease of segregation. ' '42 In N.A.A.C.P. v. HUD, Breyer acknowledged
that the affirmative duty to eradicate segregation "may be difficult to
apply to borderline instances," but he insisted, "a court should be able
to ascertain a clear failure to live up to the instruction over time."43
N.A.A.C.P. v. HUD establishes a standard for monitoring HUD's af-
firmative obligation: requiring an evaluation of whether HUD has fur-
thered fair housing, and if not, a solid explanation of why not and
whether such a failure constitutes a violation of the statute. 4
Numerous courts confronted the failure of HUD to meet its af-
firmative obligation to further fair housing following the adoption of
Title VIII. In 1970, the Third Circuit enjoined HUD from acting to
change a proposed housing project in Philadelphia from the originally
contemplated owner occupied buildings to 100 percent rent supple-
ment assistance akin to what is commonly recognized as "public hous-
ing.",45 The Third Circuit held that HUD was vested with broad discre-
tion to supervise its various programs, but its discretion must adhere to
the framework of the national policy against discrimination in federal-
ly assisted housing and in favor of affirmatively promoting fair hous-
39. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per cu-
riam).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2003). "Fair housing" under § 3601 means the elimination of dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of housing according to the legislative history. See Cong. Rec.
4975 (Mar. 4, 1968).
41. N.A.A.C.P. v. HUD, 817 F. 2d 149, 155 (1987).
42. Otero v. New York Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (3rd Cir. 1970).
43. N.A.A.C.P., 817 F. 2dat 158.
44. Id. at 158 (stating the standard as requiring "[a] straightforward evaluation of
whether agency activity over time has furthered [fair housing], and, if not, for an explanation
of why not and a determination of whether a given explanation, in light of the statute, is satis-
factory.").
45. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970).
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ing.46 The court found that the proposed conversion would serve to
further segregation, harming the federal government's interest in fair
housing.
HUD was also held liable for creating and perpetuating segre-
gated public housing in East Texas, as the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eastern District of Texas found that HUD had knowingly
created and funded racially segregated housing in thirty-six counties in
violation of the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and its affirmative obligation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 47
In 1971 in Gautreaux v. Romney, the Seventh Circuit found
HUD liable for assisting and carrying on racially discriminatory and
segregated public housing within Chicago. 4 8 Evidence indicated that
HUD knowingly allowed the racial segregation of federally assisted
housing units even though it made some "good faith" efforts to try to
seek non-segregated facilities.
HUD's failure affirmatively to further fair housing has caused
courts to mandate remedial measures to correct segregation.
B. Creation Of Court-Ordered Remedial Regimes
Court-ordered remedial measures have become an essential
element of the landscape of de-segregation in federally assisted hous-
ing. Remedying segregation has raised the particular question for
courts of whether it is appropriate to include outlying districts as part
of a court-ordered solution to intentional racial discrimination, espe-
cially when such discrimination is only evident inside a particular mu-
nicipality. The Court established in the school desegregation cases, as
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, that the nature
of the discriminatory violation determines the scope of the remedy.49
In Milliken v. Bradley, a court-ordered remedial plan that included out-
lying suburban districts was found unconstitutional because the outly-
ing areas had not participated in the complained of intentional racial
discrimination, and their inclusion in the remedial plan would have
greatly disrupted the governance of autonomous suburban school enti-
50ties. However, the Milliken decision is distinguished by courts in the
housing desegregation context.
46. Id. at 819.
47. Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
48. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731 pinpoint (7th Cir. 1971).
49. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
50. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 pinpoint (1974).
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1. Gautreaux and Metropolitan Area Remedies
In significant contrast to school desegregation, implementing a
"regional approach" as part of a remedial plan to desegregate federally
assisted housing has been found to be a remedy well-tailored to the vi-
olation and constitutional. For instance, in Hills v. Gautreaux, the
plaintiff class, black tenants and applicants for public housing in Chi-
cago, filed actions against HUD alleging intentional racial discrimina-
tion based on the placement of public housing in racially segregated
neighborhoods. 51 The Court found HUD to have violated the Constitu-
tion and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by knowingly allowing
racially segregated public housing.52 The district court denied the
plaintiff class' motion to consider metropolitan area relief as an effec-
tive remedy for the racially segregated public housing. 53 Instead, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded the decision for the adoption
of a comprehensive metropolitan area plan.54 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if the district court could order HUD to
take remedial action outside the Chicago city limits.
The Court distinguished Milliken in holding that a judicial or-
der directing relief beyond Chicago's boundaries did not entail coer-
cion of uninvolved governmental units - as in Milliken - because
HUD, as a government agency, (1) had the authority to operate outside
of Chicago's city limits and (2) had clearly violated the Constitution.5
5
The Supreme Court reasoned that a metropolitan area remedy was in
no way impermissible as a matter of law in this instance because, un-
like in Milliken, this case did not require "restructuring the operation
of local government entities." 56
Instead, the Court in Gautreaux called for deference to the dis-
trict court to correct a constitutional violation by means which would
in no way transgress the power of any suburban government entity.
The Supreme Court cited a seminal school desegregation case in lay-
ing down the scope of court-ordered remedial power. The Court rea-
soned that the scope of an equitable remedy may be sufficiently broad
to redress a right proven to be violated: "Once a right and a violation
have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
51. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 pinpoint (1976).
52. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731 pinpoint (7th Cir. 1971).
53. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 ponpoint (N.D. Ill. 1973).
54. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 935-936 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297.
56. Id. at 296-297.
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equitable remedies. 57 The district court later ordered relief in the form
of 7,100 "Section 8" housing vouchers to be used by members of the
plaintiff class in neighborhoods that were less than thirty percent Afri-
can-American.
58
2. Other Gautreaux- inspired Programs
Hills v. Gautreaux sparked a great national interest in the utili-
zation of surrounding suburban districts for the elimination of urban
housing segregation. For instance, the Clinton Administration, along-
side then Secretary of HUD Henry Cisneros, attempted to conduct a
national program of the Gautreaux sort - the "Moving to Opportunity
for Fair Housing" demonstration project - placing heavy emphasis
upon housing mobility in five major cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chica-
go, Los Angeles, and New York.59 In these cities, residents of low-
income housing received "Section 8" rental assistance vouchers to be
used in designated areas with less than ten percent poverty, as autho-
rized by federal law for ten years. 60
Additionally, the federal HOPE VI program, launched in 1992,
was created to lessen high concentrations of the urban poor living in
severely distressed public housing projects, and to replace such hous-
ing with mixed-income developments. By 2004, nearly 63,100 severe-
ly distressed units were demolished and another 20,300 units slated for
redevelopment pursuant to the HOPE VI program. 6 1 Even though
HOPE VI was designed to desegregate and de-concentrate centers of
urban poverty, many have criticized the program for its mixed results,
and the widespread demolition of public housing units without a one to
one replacement with alternative affordable housing units. 62 By and
large, the housing desegregation debate has been indelibly changed by
the Gautreaux styled remedy, and the Supreme Court's acknowledge-
ment that, unlike in the school desegregation context, the desegrega-
57. Id. at 297 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
58. Susan J. Popkin et al., The Gautreaux Legacy: What Might Mixed-Income and Dis-
persal Strategies Mean for the Poorest Public Housing Tenants?, II HOUSING POLICY DEBATE
911,912.
59. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 152,
106 Stat. 3716, 3716-3717(1992).
60. See United States Dep't. of Hous. and Urban Dev., Moving to Opportunity for Fair
Housing, http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/mto.cfm (last updated Dec. 5, 2000).
61. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & KALE WILLIAMS, HOUSING MOBILITY: REALIZING THE
PROMISE, REPORT FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ASSISTED HOUSING
MOBILITY, Urban Institute (1998).
62. Id. at 37-38.
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tion of federally assisted housing may include outlying suburban por-
tions of a metropolitan area housing market.
IV. LEGAL REASONING
In the liability phase of the Thompson v. HUD proceedings, the
Fourth Circuit explored, among other issues, the plaintiff class' three
primary claims: violation of, (1) the United States Constitution, (2)
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (3) Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.
In exploring the Plaintiffs' constitutional claim, the Fourth Cir-
cuit considered whether HUD violated the Equal Protection guarantee
of the Fifth Amendment by casting distinctions on the basis of race in
its siting decisions for federally assisted housing. 63 The Court found
that if the plaintiff class could further "prove that Defendants failed to
treat the victims of past racial discrimination as required" by law,64 or
could prove that HUD possessed the requisite intent to discriminate,
65
then Equal Protection liability would likely be established. In this way,
the Court reserved the constitutional issue for the "remedial phase" of
the trial where the issue of intent would be more thoroughly ex-
amined.66
The Fourth Circuit found the plaintiff's Title VI claim,67 based
on the prohibition of race-based discrimination in federally funded
programs, could not stand for procedural reasons. The Court found that
the plaintiffs did not have a direct right of action against a federal de-
fendant pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
68 and Title VI.69
As for the plaintiffs' Title VIII ("Fair Housing Act") claim, the
court found that HUD violated its statutory duty affirmatively to fur-
ther fair housing pursuant to Section 3608(e)(5), 70 and the Fourth Cir-
cuit emphasized that this abdication derived mainly from HUD's fail-
ure to consider regional solutions to Baltimore City's housing
63. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (D. Md. 2005).
64. See e.g., Brown v. Board of Education 11, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (establishing that
purposeful discrimination of a continuing nature may impose an affirmative obligation onto
government actors to remedy past wrongs). Cite to your case, "citing Brown."
65. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 pincite needed (1976).
66. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1966).
69. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3601, 3608 (e) (5) (2003).
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segregation problem.7 1 The court reasoned that even though the Fair
Housing Act does not mandate specific remedial measures necessary
to effect desegregation, the law does impose a high standard for the
government, disallowing the maintenance and perpetuation of the sta-
72tus quo ante when segregation exists.
The Fourth Circuit concluded by reemphasizing its finding of
statutory violation and noting that "the case shall proceed to the re-
medial trial phase pursuant to the decision herein."73
V. ANALYSIS
Undoubtedly, the Thompson decision embodies great promise
for the future enforcement of federal statutory law in the pursuit of fair
housing. However, the power of the Thompson decision to reverse ra-
cial discrimination in Baltimore public housing is dependent upon the
district court's pending remedial decision, and the effectiveness of that
decision. The plaintiffs proposed plan - a Gautreaux-styled remedy,74
likely will serve to desegregate Baltimore city, however, it is also like-
ly to create new social harms in the suburbs, merely shifting some of
the problems endemic to poverty from one place to another. Among
the new harms likely will be (1) significant employment barriers to
former public housing residents in the suburbs, (2) an overall lack of
social capital for movers once they arrive in the suburbs, (3) an in-
creased cost of living and increased transportation costs, (4) and con-
flict with "not in my backyard" attitudes.
A. Employment Barriers
Evidence indicates that mobility programs have little positive
impact on movers' employment situations. Most notably, Kirschenman
and Neckerman found that when searching for suburban employment
"if an individual is African American, has a low income, and is from
the inner city, or is perceived as such, these characteristics severely
hinder the person's employment chances. 75 A 2005 study of the
71. See e.g., Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (stating, "It is simply inadequate to try
to solve the problem by redistributing the population of Baltimore City within the city limits).
72. See e.g., Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (discussing the affirmative statutory ob-
ligation to promote fair housing or housing free from discrimination).
73. Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
74. See supra, note 13.
75. Joanna M. Reed et al., Voucher Use, Labor Force Participation, and Life Priorities:
Findings From the Gautreaux Two Housing Mobility Study, 8 CITYSCAPE 219, 221 (2005) (de-
scribing Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn Neckerman, We'd Love to Hire Them But ... The
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"Gautreaux Two" housing mobility experiment, 76 a successor to the
original court-ordered Gautreaux project, found that only seven per-
cent of movers started new jobs in their new neighborhoods following
their move to "areas of opportunity" from Chicago public housing
projects. 77 In fact, thirty-six percent of movers maintained their jobs,
childcare arrangements, and social networks that they possessed in
their old neighborhoods, 78 and thirty-six percent of movers did not
work at all because of severe personal and health problems.79
Raphael, Stoll, and Holzer found that even black suburban em-
ployers were less likely to employ low-income, suburban black appli-
cants than were central-city black employers even though "educational
attainment is positively correlated with suburban residences ... among
blacks." 80 In a seminal assessment of the effectiveness of the Gau-
treaux mobility program, Popkin, Buron, Levy, and Cunningham con-
clude that, "rather than big economic changes, the research implies
that the major benefit of mixed-income approaches for those public
housing residents who are able to obtain units will be an improved
quality of life in a substantially safer, better-maintained community.
81
However, the same authors go on to raise doubts about the sustaina-
bility of movers living in the "safer, better-maintained community," as
movers are dependent upon positive relationships with private market
landlords in order to keep their units.
82
Additionally, Popkin et. al. suggest that private landlords are
less likely to be sensitive to the problems confronted by former public
housing tenants when they rent private market units to government is-
sued voucher-holders - problems like mental illness, substance abuse,
and the need to shelter non-nuclear family members. 83 The evidence
indicates that movers in Gautreaux- style mobility programs expe-
rience small gains, if any, to labor market participation. Even though
Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E.
Peterson eds., The Brookings Institution, 1991).).
76. Id. at 222. The Gautreaux Two Program offered residents who were current public
housing residents in Chicago, in good standing, to place their name on a list to receive vouch-
ers that would enable them to move to certain designated "opportunity areas." The program
defines "opportunity areas" as census tracts where the African-American population does not
exceed 30 percent and only 24 percent of residents are living in poverty.
77. Id. at 233.
78. Id. at 230.
79. Id. at 232.
80. Steven Raphael et al., Are Suburban Firms More Likely to Discriminate Against
African-Americans?, 48 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS 3, 17 (Nov. 2000).
81. Popkin, supra note 58, at 935.
82. Id. at 934.
83. Id.
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the Thompson plaintiffs' proposed plan attempts to provide "mobility
counseling" to assist residents in securing, among other things, em-
ployment opportunities in the suburbs, there is little evidence that mo-
bility counseling can help movers overcome the racial prejudices of
suburban employers.
B. Lack of Social Capital and The Increased Cost of Transportation
Strong advocates of mobility programs argue that when access
to suburban housing units is provided to low-income families, the fam-
ilies are likely to leverage the assistance of neighbors and suburban
acquaintances to attain employment and other valued social resources.
As Briggs argues, many people in underclass neighborhoods lack "so-
cial capital," or the assistance of neighbors with resources like college
educations or powerful social networks, to assist them in their upward
mobility. 84 However, some contend that there is little proof that intro-
ducing low-income residents to neighbors with resources contributes
to their upward mobility. Specifically, Popkin asserts that there is no
"strong evidence that exposing low-income public housing tenants to
higher-income residents has any effect on their employment or educa-
tional outcomes. ' '8 5 In fact, research indicates that many public hous-
ing residents that re-locate to the suburbs continue to prefer, and go to
great lengths to sustain, their old social networks in their former
neighborhoods. 86 As a consequence, these particular participants pay
increased costs for transportation back to the resources and networks
with which they are most familiar.8 7 Also, as mentioned above, the
need for transportation back to a movers' original community may be
born out of necessity because an individual cannot find a job in the
suburbs due to employment discrimination, and shopping and conduct-
ing business in the suburbs is more expensive, forcing that person to
continue to work and shop inside the city.88 One of the challenges of
twenty-first century housing policy will be to acknowledge and con-
sider the valuable ties that low-income African-Americans make to
84. See generally, Xavier de Souza Briggs, Moving Up versus Moving Out: Neighbor-
hood Effects in Housing Mobility Programs. 8 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 195-234 (1997).
85. Popkin, supra note 58, at 928.
86. See, e.g, Reed, supra note 72, at 230 (discussing mobility program participants that
prefer to continue to maintain jobs, childcare arrangements, and social networks from their
original neighborhoods).
87. See, e.g., id. (citing the example of a former public housing resident in the Gau-
treaux Two housing study who had to buy a new car to make the commute back to her old
neighborhood where she still works and shops).
88. See supra, Part V.(1).
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survive in urban neighborhoods, and to incorporate this understanding
into mobility programs. 89 Assigning a higher social value to middle or
upper-class social networks than to networks of poor African-
Americans seems to be a normative judgment that this author is unwil-
ling to make.
90
C. NIMB Y Conflict
Suburban opposition to welcoming low-income neighbors into
middle class neighborhoods, commonly characterized as the "Not in
My Backyard" (NIMBY) effect, has been regarded by many as indica-
tive of the prejudice and irrational bigotry of suburbanites. However,
in an extremely narrow context, some scholars argue that NIMBYism
represents the expression of logical fears on the part of middle class
residents because a reduction in property prices is attributed to the
presence of low-income tenants.
91
Galster analyzed the persistent drop in property values when
more than a critical mass of low-income voucher-holders relocated
within the same vicinity.92 Indeed, the Thompson plaintiffs' proposed
remedial plan addresses this issue by appointing a Regional Adminis-
trator who is given the task of prohibiting referrals of plaintiffs to
housing units where more than twenty percent of the units in any one
apartment complex or development are leased by Housing Choice
Voucher holders.93 However, the Thompson proposed remedial plan
states no requirements for the Regional Administrator to track the po-
verty concentration of the particular neighborhood as a whole,94 but,
rather, simply precludes resegregation in particular apartment com-
89. See, e.g., Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, We Must Acknowledge How Poor People Live,
POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Counsel), January/February 2005, at 5-6
(stating, "the poor live in networks and households. These fluid ties, rooted in kind and the
exchange of symbolic goods (e.g. intimacy) and commodities (babysitting), hold for white
ethnics and Latinos as well as blacks. How to incorporate this variability in a voucher pro-
gram? I'm not sure, but it would be nice if the leading minds would take it seriously.").
90. There are tremendous social benefits experienced by families in low-income housing
who depend upon each other for babysitting, informal loans, transportation etc., all things un-
available to individuals away from their social network.
91. George Galster, Making a Nationwide Gautreaux Program More "Neighborhood
Friendly," POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Counsel), January/February
2005, at 7 (citing WHY NOT IN MY BACKYARD?: NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACTS OF
DECONCENTRATING ASSISTED HOUSING (George Galster, et al. eds., Rutgers Univ. Ctr. for Ur-
ban Policy Research 2003)(2003).).
92. Id.
93. See supra, note 18.
94. "Neighborhood" here indicates a unit much smaller than the census tract designated
by the Thompson court as a "Community of Opportunity."
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plexes. Galster contends that "the neighborhood level distribution of
voucher holders" is the most essential ingredient to ensuring that rese-
gregation does not occur in suburban territories.95 The remedial plan
must aim to prevent a reflexive white flight away from low-income
residents in the suburbs, invoking a game of "musical chairs," in
which the neighborhood effects of high concentrations of poverty are
the same but for the fact that they would be experienced in a different
place, the suburbs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the 1930's, federal housing programs have contributed to
the creation and prevalence of Baltimore's racially segregated public
housing stock. Living in a distressed community - one socially iso-
lated, with a high concentration of poverty - is devastating to a fami-
ly's access to opportunity, it bares significant negative mental and
physical health effects, and it negatively affects the city's overall well-
being. 96 In light of these facts, mobility programs are unquestionably
beneficial to reversing the effects of housing discrimination and to
ushering new resources to families in distressed communities. Howev-
er, it is imperative that courts, and in particular the Thompson court,
consider a remedial plan that will offer mobility as an option - but not
the only option - for reversing racially segregated housing. In fact, it
seems clear that the most disadvantaged families 97 may not fair well
renting from private landlords in suburbs away from their informal
support networks and jobs in the city, even with the support of "mobil-
ity counselors." Mobility should not be an "all or nothing" adventure
for participants, a choice between remaining with the status quo ante -
in a segregated urban neighborhood - or submitting one's family to an
entirely new environment with new rules.
Instead, the Thompson court's remedial decision should, in ad-
dition to offering a mobility program, mandate a new regime of "inclu-
95. George Galster, Making a Nationwide Gautreaux Program More "Neighborhood
Friendly," POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Counsel), January/February
2005, at 7.
96. See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner and Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, Why Housing Mobil-
ity?: The Research Evidence Today, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action
Counsel), January/February 2005, at 2 (stating that "a considerable body of social science re-
search finds evidence that living in profoundly poor or distressed neighborhoods can have a
significant impact on people's well-being and longer-term life chances.")
97. For instance, like those that are severely disabled or mentally ill, and depend on the
help and assistance of informal networks in their low-income community for their own surviv-
al.
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sionary zoning" in Baltimore. 98 Inclusionary zoning relies on market
forces to create more affordable housing units inside a city. IZ laws
mandate that a specified percentage (usually ten or fifteen percent) of
new housing development in a city must be affordable for low-income
families. 99 Many IZ policies offer "density bonuses" allowing builders
to put up more housing than the zoning laws usually permit, serving to
lower the cost to the builder of the inclusionary unit. 10 To incorporate
IZ principles into its remedial decision, the court should demand a Bal-
timore City "fair share" requirement, 10 1 and it should permit the Bal-
timore City Council to pass laws providing regulations for how best to
meet that requirement.
IZ will serve to complement and supplement the Plaintiffs
proposed mobility program. IZ will enable those who are most disad-
vantaged, and less likely to meet the requirements of the mobility pro-
gram, to live in a non-segregated, city dwelling. Further, IZ will help
to keep "workforce housing" in Baltimore, so that those with service
sector jobs necessary to the city's economy may reasonably afford to
both live inside the city and apart from highly concentrated poor en-
claves. And finally, inclusionary zoning will insure that Baltimore City
continues to possess the racial diversity necessary to enrich the lives of
its citizens, and to remain competitive with other United States cities
of comparable size.
The Thompson court must recognize that the scope of the com-
plained of discrimination requires a remedy that functions creatively to
attack segregation from all angles. By July 2006, there were 39,315
units of assisted rental housing in Baltimore,' 0 3 however, the plaintiff
class, composed of some 14,000 public housing residents, proposes the
creation of just 900 housing opportunities per year for ten years.
104
That is not to mention that voucher-holders likely will confront dis-
crimination from private landlords in the free market, as there seems
yet to be a federal fair housing law banning "source of income" dis-
98. David Rusk, Inclusionary Zoning - Gautreaux by Another Pathway, POVERTY &
RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Counsel), January/February 2005, at 9.
99. Id. Over 135 county and city governments have enacted mandatory inclusionary
zoning laws since 1973. Id.
100. Id.
101. A "fair share" meaning a specified percentage of new housing set-aside for low-in-
come residents.
102. See, e.g., S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158 (1983) (Mount Laurel II) (establishing a "fair share formula" to determine whether each
municipality had met its obligation to provide affordable housing).
103. Baltimore City Task Force on Inclusionary Zoning, At Home in Baltimore: A Plan
for an Inclusive City of Neighborhoods 7 (July 2006).
104. See "Plaintiff's Proposed Remedial Order," supra note 13.
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crimination, and private market discrimination against voucher-holders
is prevalent.
10 5
Only time will tell how the Thompson remedial decision reads.
However, for it to be effective, and not just an exemplar of costly,
time-consuming, decade-spanning, litigation, it must consider the
enormity of the problem, multiple means to attack that problem, and
the specific needs and interests of the wronged plaintiff class that it
seeks to serve. New social harms can be avoided by the Fourth Circuit
upon the realization that mobility, although a salient solution, may not
be for everyone.
105. Libby Perl, Needed Element: Laws Prohibiting Source of Income Discrimination,
David Rusk, Inclusionary Zoning - Gautreaux by Another Pathway, POVERTY & RACE (Pover-
ty & Race Research Action Counsel), January/February 2005, at 8.
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